DUAL-USE NO LONGER NEUTRAL

The concept of “dual-use” has, for long, occupied a central place in the governance of sensitive technologies. In export control regimes and arms control discussions the term generally refers to technologies that can serve both military and civilian purposes ranging from chemical precursors and satellite systems to commercial drones and artificial intelligence tools. Because these technologies support civilian innovation and economic activity, international regulatory frameworks have historically treated them as inherently neutral, focusing on controlling their transfer or misuse rather than restricting the technologies themselves. Frameworks such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the European Union’s dual-use export control framework reflect the assumption that the same technological system may be legitimate in civilian contexts but unlawful when diverted into military applications. Similar assumptions are also reflected in other arms control regimes, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, where schedules distinguish between highly restricted chemicals and substances that retain widespread civilian applications despite their potential for weaponization.

However, contemporary conflicts regularly challenge this neutrality assumption. Many technologies that are formally categorized as dual-use are now embedded in military ecosystems from the outset, integrated into surveillance systems, targeting architectures, and operational command structures. The Syrian conflict offers a particularly revealing illustration of this transformation. Over the course of conflict, a range of technologies commonly described as dual-use have played direct roles in military operations and weapons development.

This article argues that development in Syria highlight a broader conceptual shift that the “dual-use” is no longer functioning as a neutral descriptive category in the governance of militarized technology. Instead, it increasingly operates as a strategic and political classification that conceals the very militarized contexts in which many contemporary technologies are deployed.

International law has traditionally approached dual-use technologies through regulatory frameworks that assume technological neutrality. In its most basic form, a dual-use technology is one that can serve both civilian and military purposes depending on the context in which it is deployed. Rather than prohibiting such technologies outright, international governance mechanisms have focused on regulating their transfer, export, and end-use. Export control administrations in particular have institutionalized this approach, seeking to prevent the diversion of sensitive technologies into weapons programmes while preserving legitimate civilian innovation and trade.¹

One of the most significant international framework in this regard is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export controls for conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, which maintains lists of controlled items that participating states must agree to regulate through national export licensing systems.² Similarly the European Union’s dual-use export control framework establishes a comprehensive system for monitoring the export of sensitive goods, software, and technologies that could potentially contribute to military capabilities or weapons development.³ These frameworks do not treat dual-use technologies as inherently problematic. Instead, they assume that risk emerges primarily through misuse, diversion, or proliferation.

Underlying this regulatory model is the broader assumption that technologies themselves remain fundamentally neutral. The same satellite imagery system, industrial chemical compound, or data analytical platform may be deployed for civilian economic activity, scientific research ,or humanitarian purposes, but may also be repurposed for intelligence gathering, surveillance, or weapons development. For this reason, international governance actors have generally focused on controlling access and transfer, rather than attempting to prohibit entire categories of technology.⁴

In recent years, however, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence systems, autonomous platforms, and advances surveillance architectures have complicated this framework. As scholars and policy institutions increasingly notes, many contemporary technological systems are developed within tightly integrated civil-military applications.⁵ These developments raise important questions about whether the assumption of technological neutrality that supports dual-use governance remains sustainable in modern conflicts.

Yet the experience of recent conflicts suggests that the assumption of technological neutrality behind these regulatory frameworks is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

Syria and the Militarization of Dual-Use Technology

The Syrian Conflict provides a particularly stark example of how technologies commonly categorized as “dual-use” can become deeply embedded within military systems. Over the course of the conflict, a range of civilian technologies and industrial materials, including chemical precursors, commercial drones, and satellite-enabled intelligence tools, have been incorporated directly into battlefield operations and weapons development. These developments demonstrate the extent to which the boundary between civilian and military technological systems has become increasingly porous in contemporary conflicts.

Perhaps the most widely documented concerns the weaponization of industrial chemical substances. Investigations conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United National OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism have confirmed multiple instances in which chlorine, a widely used industrial chemical, was employed as a weapon in attacks during the Syrian conflict.⁶ Chlorine is not listed among the most strictly controlled substances under the Chemical Weapons Convention precisely because of its widespread civilian applications in water purification, sanitation, and industrial manufacturing. Yet the Syrian case demonstrates how such chemicals can be readily repurposed for military use once integrated into weapons delivery system such as improvised barrel bombs or artillery munitions.⁷

The proliferation of commercially available drone technology in the Syrian conflict provides another example of the rapid militarization of dual-use systems. Both state forces and non-state armed groups have used commercially manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, targeting, and in some cases the delivery of improvised explosive devices.⁸ Originally developed for recreational, agricultural, or commercial photography purposes, these systems have been readily adapted for battlefield use due to their accessibility, relatively low cost, and modular design. As analysts have observed, the Syrian conflict became one of the first major threats in which widely available commercial drone technology was systematically integrated into military operations by multiple actors.⁹

Digital satellite-based technologies have similarly played an important role in the conflict. High-resolution commercial satellite imagery and open-source intelligence tools have been used not only by journalists and humanitarian investigators but also by military actors seeking enhanced situational awareness and targeting capabilities.¹⁰ These developments illustrate a broader trend in which civilian technological ecosystems, particularly those related to data analytics, remote sensing, and digital communications, are increasingly intertwined with military decision-making processes.

Taken together, these examples suggest that the technologies commonly described as dual-use are rarely neutral in practice once they enter the dynamic of contemporary conflict. Instead, the Syrian case demonstrates how civilian technological infrastructures and commercial innovation can rapidly become embedded within military systems, raising important questions about the continuing viability of dual-use as a stable analytical category in the governance of militarized technology.

Why Dual-Use Technology Is No Longer Neutral

While dual-use governance frameworks traditionally assume that technologies are neutral tools whose risks emerge primarily through misuse or diversion, contemporary technological ecosystems increasingly blur the boundary between civilian innovation and military application. The examples discussed above illustrate not simply the opportunistic repurposing of civilian technologies, but a deeper structural dynamic in which civilian technological systems are readily integrated into military infrastructures.

One reason for this shift lies in the growing integration of civil and military innovation systems. Many emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, data analytics platforms, satellite services, and autonomous systems, are developed within commercial technology sectors that operate simultaneously within civilian markets and national security environments.¹¹ Rather than existing as separate spheres, civilian and military technological development often occur within the same industrial and research ecosystems. As a result, technologies categorized as dual-use may already be designed in ways that anticipate potential military applications.¹²

A second factor concerns the modular and networked nature of contemporary technological systems. Technologies such as drones, digital mapping platforms, and satellite-enabled communications systems can be rapidly incorporated into military operational networks without requiring fundamental redesign. In the Syrian context, commercially available drones were integrated into reconnaissance and targeting processes, while industrial chemicals were adapted into weapons delivery systems. These examples illustrate how relatively minor modifications or integrations can transform ostensibly civilian technologies into operational components of military capability.¹³

A related dynamic is the growing technological convergence between multiple civilian innovation sectors. Contemporary military capabilities increasingly rely on the integration of artificial intelligence systems, remote sensing technologies, satellite-based communications, and large-scale data analytics. When these technologies are combined within a single operational architecture, the distinction between civilian technological infrastructure and military capability becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

Finally, the persistence of the dual-use category itself can create a form of strategic ambiguity in the governance of emerging technologies. Because the label emphasizes potential civilian applications, it can obscure the extent to which certain technologies are already embedded in military infrastructures. Export control regimes and regulatory frameworks built around the concept of dual-use therefore face increasing difficulty in distinguishing between civilian technological diffusion and the expansion of military capability.¹⁴ In practice, this ambiguity may allow technologies that play significant roles in modern warfare to continue circulating within global commercial markets under the assumption that they remain fundamentally civilian tools.

The Syrian case therefore illustrates a broader conceptual problem. The technologies involved are not merely civilian tools diverted into conflict environments; rather, they are products of technological ecosystems in which the boundary between civilian and military applications had become increasingly indistinct. As emerging technologies continue to reshape contemporary warfare, the assumption that dual-use functions as a neutral analytical category appears increasingly difficult to sustain.

Implications for Arms Control and International Law

If the Syrian conflict illustrates the growing instability of the dual-use category in militarized technology, it also raises important questions for the governance frameworks that reply upon that category. Contemporary export control regimes, including arrangements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the European Union’s dual-use regulatory system, are built around the assumption that technologies can be meaningfully distinguished according to their potential civilian or military uses.¹⁵ These frameworks therefore focus on regulating transfers of sensitive items while allowing civilian technologies to continue unhindered.

Yet the examples discussed above suggest that this regulatory model is increasingly difficult to sustain. Technologies such as commercial drones, satellite-based data services, and advanced digital analytics circulate widely through global commercial markets, making them difficult to control through traditional export licensing mechanisms. Moreover, because these systems often derive from civilian innovation ecosystems, their integration into military operations may occur through adaptation and network integration rather than through the direct transfer of specialized hardware.¹⁶

This dynamic creates a growing tension within existing arms control and export governance structures. On the one hand, restrictive control risk stifling civilian innovation and international technological cooperations. On the other hand, regulatory frameworks that reply heavily on the assumption of technological neutrality may underestimate the extent to which certain technologies are already embedded within military capability. As scholars of emerging military technologies have noted, contemporary innovation environments increasingly involve tightly interconnected civil-military ecosystems in which technological development cannot easily be separates into civilian and military domains.¹⁷

The Syrian conflict therefore highlights a broader governance challenge – the regulatory frameworks designed to manage dual-use technology were developed in an era when civilian and military technological systems were more clearly differentiated. As technological convergence accelerates, international law and arms control institutions may need to reconsider whether the binary distinction between civilian and military technology remains a viable foundation for governing emerging militarized targets.

Conclusion

The concept of dual-use technology has long served a foundational principle in the governance of sensitive technologies. By distinguishing between civilian and military applications, international regulatory frameworks have sought to balance the promotion of innovation with the prevention of military proliferation. Yet the dynamics of contemporary conflict increasingly challenge the assumption that technologies can be neatly categorized according to these two domains. As the Syrian conflict demonstrates, many technologies formally described as dual-use, ranging from industrial chemical precursors to commercial drone platforms and satellite-enabled intelligence tools, are readily incorporated into military systems with minimal transformation.

These developments suggest that the concept of dual-use is gradually losing its analytical neutrality in the context of militarized technology. Rather than describing inherently civilian technologies that may occasionally be diverted into military use, the category increasingly encompasses technologies that emerge from deeply interconnected civil-military innovation ecosystems. As emerging technologies continue to reshape the conduct of warfare, the assumption that dual-use represents a stable and neutral classification may become progressively harder to sustain. For international law and arms control governance, this raises and important challenge – whether regulatory frameworks built around the distinction between civilian and military technology remain adequate for managing the realities of technologically mediated conflict.